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DOE WITHOUT JANE:  
THE GENDERED HARMS OF PSEUDONYMOUS LITIGATION 
BRITTANY HACKER 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis, written in conjunction for the School of Law and Graduate School of 
Philosophy offers a legal and theoretical exploration of gendered pseudonymous 
litigation. Pseudonymous litigation, most commonly the use of “Jane Doe or John Doe” 
seeks to provide anonymity for parties in litigation concerning sensitive matters. 
However, this traditional practice inserts bias into the legal process by indicating the 
gender of the parties. Not only does this allow for bias based on gender, but it can also 
allow for bias based on sexual orientation and can prevent non-binary and transgender 
individuals from being able to identify properly. This thesis explores these concerns and 
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 The use of gendered pseudonymous litigation has long been the norm in 
American law, but its limited benefits can no longer outweigh its harm.  For the purposes 
of this paper, “gendered pseudonymous litigation” includes the use of the party names 
“John” and “Jane” as a precursor to a generic last name, such as “Doe” or “Roe.”  The 
use of gendered pronouns in court proceedings and opinions of the Court amplify these 
potential harms.   
 The harm that unfolds is two-part.  First, in the discussion of binary individuals 
who choose to identify as male or female, the use of gendered names in pseudonymous 
litigation leads to biased assumptions, implicit and explicit, by decision-makers and by 
the greater public who may see the results of the litigation in printed opinions.1  Second, 
gendering pseudonymous litigation creates a bind for non-binary individuals who do not 
identify as a “Jane” or “John,” but are forced into a category that is contrary to their 
gender identity—denying them the right to autonomous self-determination.    
 This note proceeds, beginning in section II, by exploring the origins of 
pseudonymous litigation and surveys areas of law where it is frequently employed.  
Section III notes the harms and benefits of having pseudonymous litigation available 
generally.  This note takes as a premise that the use of pseudonymous litigation should 
 
1 Gregory Mitchell, An Implicit Bias Primer, 25 VA. J.  SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 30 (2018). Throughout this 
note, in discussing gender bias, I generally take bias to apply to individuals who identify as male or 




continue, because pseudonyms generally have value in ensuring privacy for sensitive 
litigation. However, it contends that using gendered terms in pseudonymous litigation 
causes unreasonable harm.  Drawing on feminist and queer philosophy, this note argues 
that the harm to non-binary individuals and the bias that arises from presenting the gender 
of litigants in sensitive matters is inherently unjust and can be simply resolved by 
removing gendered names in pseudonyms. 
 
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 Before 1969, the use of pseudonyms was very rare in litigation and primarily was 
used as a place-holder when the plaintiff did not know the defendant’s name.2  In the late 
60s and early 70s, the spike in abortion cases caused the use of pseudonymous names 
became more prevalent.3  Generally, courts approve use when revealing the identities of 
one or more parties would result in stigmatization, threat of physical harm, or retaliation.4 
  However, the existing rules, or lack thereof, make it difficult to predict what will 
be ruled a compelling reason to grant a pseudonym.5  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not explicitly authorize pseudonymous litigation and federal courts have 
 
2 Prior to the abortion cases that began in 1969, there was only one Supreme Court case, three court of 
appeals decisions and one district court decision with an anonymous plaintiff.  Joan E. Steinman, 
Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities 
Confidential, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1985).   
3 Steinman, supra note 2, at 1–2.  
4 See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 159 (1994) (quoting Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 
161 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“the common thread running through these cases [permitting pseudonyms] is 
the presence of some social stigma or the threat of physical harm to the plaintiffs attaching to 
disclosure of their identities to the public record”)); see also Doe v. Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“danger of retaliation is often a compelling ground for allowing a party to litigate 
anonymously”).  
5 Steinman, supra note 2, at 1 n.2. 
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not set out a clear precedent because denials of pseudonym are rarely appealed.6  The 
lack of appeals do not represent a devaluing of pseudonyms, but rather demonstrate the 
deterrent effect of added time and expense.7  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) 
requires that a complaint initiating litigation give the names of the parties to the suit.8  
However, while not specifically authorized, most courts have held that the Rules’ silence 
does not prohibit proceeding pseudonymously.9  Scholars have also argued that Rule 
10(a) does not impact pseudonymous litigation at all, but rather that the rule is meant 
only to distinguish a formal caption, which would list every plaintiff, from one that is 
shortened for judicial economy.10  Thus, the rule may not be “dictat[ing] the substance of 
the name designation” at all.11  The resulting lack of clarity has left the ultimate decision 
making authority with each individual judge.12 
 To initiate pseudonymous litigation, the requesting party moves to use a 
pseudonym by requesting a protective order.13  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) 
provides the mechanism for requesting “protection from annoyance, embarrassment, or 
oppression in the discovery process.”14  As the standard practice is to identify litigants, 
 
6 Id. at 85.   
7 Id. at 28 n.127 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08 (1984)).   
8 Doe v. Blue Cross, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997).  
9 Steinman, supra note 2, at 35 n.154 (citing Coe v. District Court, 676 F.2d 411, 414 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981)).   
10 Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response to 
Systematic Intimidation, 20 UNLV L. REV. 437, 444 (2013).  
11 Id. (citing Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John 
Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 911 (1996)). 
12 Joan E. Steinman, Pseudonymous Suits in the U.S.A.– An Update, in INTERNET Y PODER JUDICIAL 
EN AMERICA LAINA Y EL CARIBE- REGLAS DE HEREDIA 1, 6 (Carlos G. Gregorio & Sonia Navarro 
eds., 2004). 
13 See, e.g., Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 156 (1994) (initiating a motion to proceed 
under pseudonym in pretrial proceedings with use to be reviewed after jury selection).   




the party moving for pseudonym bears the burden of proving the need for 
confidentiality.15  In many cases, the judge will initially grant the protective order to 
begin the proceedings pseudonymously, and then will later have a more involved hearing 
on the merits of the motion.16  The court may also request sealed affidavits revealing the 
true identity of the pseudonymous plaintiffs.17  If sealed affidavits are used, the judge and 
the parties would know the identities, but not the public.  If the court denies the motion to 
proceed under pseudonym and the parties do not reveal their identities, the case can be 
dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 10(a).18 
In considering whether to allow the use of a pseudonym, the judge applies a 
balancing test that considers the public benefit of knowing the names of the litigants 
against the harm to any constitutional rights, retaliation, stigmatization or harm to their 
physical or psychological welfare that may occur if the names are revealed.19  This 
balancing process, however, does not follow any clearly established rule or test, but 
rather relies on the discretion of the judge.20  Take as an example the case of Doe v. 
Stegall.21  There, the judge granted anonymity because the plaintiff was 1) challenging 
government activity, 2) the case involved religious beliefs (a matter the court held to be 
 
580, 581 (1981). 
15 Steinman, supra note 2, at 36. 
16 Rosenberger, supra note 14, at 582. 
17 Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989). 
18 See, e.g., M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1998). 
19 See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 158 (1994) (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 
185 (5th Cir. 1981) (anonymity should “only be granted if the need for anonymity ‘overwhelms the 
presumption of disclosure mandated by procedural custom.’”)); Steinman, supra note 2, at 78–79. 
20 Minnesota is an exception to this rule—the state law guarantees that rape victims can proceed 
pseudonymously in civil and criminal cases. Molly McDonough, Bringing them Back to “Doe:” 
Pseudonyms Are on the Rise, But Many Judges Question Need to Mask Plaintiff IDs, 90 ABA 
JOURNAL 18, 19 (2004); Steinman, supra note 12, at 6. 
21 653 F.2d 180.  
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fundamentally private), 3) the plaintiff could expect extensive harassment and violent 
reprisals were their identity to become known and 4) the plaintiff’s status as a child made 
him particularly vulnerable.22  This example demonstrates that the decision to grant 
anonymity is often multifaceted and based on a totality of circumstances including traits 
of the plaintiffs, effects of the litigation and the nature of the claims.23   
There are some categories of cases more likely to be granted a pseudonym.  A 
commonly granted and well-known category is that of reproductive rights.24  Because 
abortion involves the practice of a constitutional right uniquely tied to privacy and may 
have a stigmatizing effect in some communities, the courts have generally granted use of 
pseudonym.25  The Western District of Louisiana, in granting use of pseudonym, noted 
“the chilling effect of publicly airing so private a matter as the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy may well preclude a woman from seeking vindication of her constitutional 
rights in federal court.”26   
 Minors, as defendants, plaintiffs, and involved parties, are frequently the subject 
of pseudonymous litigation.27  Anonymizing juvenile defendants helps to ensure their 
ability to eventually rehabilitate fully after any punishment has been served.28  Cases 
involving child protective services or disputes over paternity have also been anonymized 
 
22 Colleen E. Michuda, Defendant Doe’s Quest for Anonymity: Is the Hurdle Insurmountable?, 29 
LOY. L. REV. 141, 153 (1997).  
23 Id. 
24 Steinman, supra note 2, at 46.   
25 Id.   
26 Id. at 44–45 (citing Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 644 (W.D. 
La. 1980)).  
27 Id. at 65. 
28 Id.   
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on a case-by-case basis.29  In those cases, the public has less interest in knowing the name 
of the child who is the subject of the dispute.30  
 Sexual assault cases are frequently permitted to employ pseudonyms due to the 
effects of trauma and need for privacy.31  In one case involving sexual assault by a 
clergyman, the court noted “public exposure would have further traumatizing effects on 
the plaintiff’s personal and professional life.  He feels shame and humiliation and public 
exposure would increase the plaintiff’s feelings of shame.”32  Minnesota has statutorily 
enshrined the right to have a pseudonym in cases of sexual assault, seeking to encourage 
victims to come forward with their claims.33 
Cases involving mental illness are frequently allowed to proceed pseudonymously 
to protect the privacy of the litigant against societal judgment.34  Pseudonymous litigation 
has also been available for members of the LGBTQ community who did not want to 
reveal their sexual or gender identities.35  One final category that judges commonly 
recognize as worthy of protection is when the plaintiff fears retaliation of physical 
harm.36  The case of Doe v. Lally, involving a same-sex rape while incarcerated noted 
that singling out the plaintiff as a rape victim, while in prison, would stigmatize him and 
 
29 Michuda, supra note 22, at 170–71; Steinman, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
30 Steinman, supra note 2, at 69. 
31 See, e.g., Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 152 (1994). 
32 Id. at 153. 
33 McDonough, supra note 20, at 19. 
34 See Doe v. Anker, 451 F. Supp. 241, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Steinman, supra note 2, at 53. 
35 See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Steinman, supra note 2, at 50. It should be 
foreshadowed that, in litigation involving the LGBTQ community, as discussed below, pseudonyms 
that include gender markers can be particularly harmful to identity formation and lead to unnecessary 
bias. 
36 Rosenberger, supra note 14, at 586. 
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also make him susceptible to further attack.37  
 Litigants in sexual harassment cases frequently attempt to use pseudonyms, but 
their requests are often denied.38 Cases involving medical records are also not typically 
granted anonymity.39  At least one district court, the Northern District of California, has 
held “that the plaintiff may suffer some embarrassment or economic harm is not enough.  
There must be a strong societal interest in concealing the identity of the plaintiff.”40  By 
excluding potential economic harm, most corporations are prevented from proceeding 
anonymously, especially considering the public interest in holding corporations 
accountable.41  
 Immigration law almost universally protects defendants by using initials in case 
captions of opinions.42  The Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual requires that 
in motions before the court, movants must “state clearly their full names and alien 
registration numbers (“A numbers”), including all family members.”43  Thus, the 
proceedings before the judge are not pseudonymous.44  However, in published opinions, 
the Practice Manual states: “where appropriate, the parties’ names are abbreviated, and 
 
37 Doe v. Lally, 46 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (D. Md. 1979). 
38 See Doe v. Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding “the plaintiff is not a minor, a rape 
or torture victim” or “a likely target of retaliation by people who would learn her identity only from a 
judicial opinion or other court filing” although “danger of retaliation is often a compelling ground for 
allowing a party to litigate anonymously”).  
39 See Doe v. Blue Cross, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding “the fact that a case involves a 
medical issue is not a sufficient reason for allowing the use of a fictitious name, even though many 
people are understandably secretive about their medical problems”).  
40 Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
41 Id.  
42 See, e.g., Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018). 
43 BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE 




alien registration numbers (“A numbers”) are redacted.”45  While this implies discretion 
of the judge, most opinions, in practice, are captioned using initials.46  
 Initials have also appeared in cases across the United States in place of the “Doe” 
name, seemingly without justification.  For example, W.N.J. v. Yocom is one such case 
that uses initials, but the decision of the court assesses the use just as it would any 
pseudonym, without paying special attention to the application of initials as opposed to 
another pseudonym.47  One possibility for why this occurs may just be that the plaintiff 
preferred it and the judge did not object. Alternatively, the particular judge could have 
been acting out of concern for bias—embracing the method endorsed in this note. Given 
that there is no clear rule, it seems likely that discretion of either the judge or the party 
explains the use of initials and demonstrates the ease with which a system-wide change 
could be enacted. 
It should, of course, be noted that most of these examples and “standards” arise 
from district court proceedings that are not widely applied nationally or even across the 
state.48  Some courts, such as the 7th Circuit, have made blanket statements 
“disfavor[ing] anonymous litigation.”49  About one third of states specifically permit the 
 
45 Id. at 190.  
46 See, e.g., J-R-G-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 482 (BIA 2018); M-A-C-O-, 27 I&N Dec. 477 (BIA 2018); M-S-, 
27 I&N Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018); M-G-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 475 (A.G. 2018).  
47 257 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2001). 
48 Edwards, supra note 10, at 441. 
49 Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005); see Doe v. Blue Cross, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“The privilege of suing or defending under a fictitious name should not be granted 
automatically even if the opposing party does not object.  The use of fictitious names is disfavored, 
and the judge has an independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify such a 
departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts”). The court, however, notes 
“[t]here are exceptions. Records or parts of records are sometimes sealed for good reasons, including 




use of pseudonyms, a third have not addressed the use of pseudonyms and in another 
third, their view on the matter is unclear.50  Whether a pseudonym is granted can have 
broad implications for the privacy and security of the party, but this important decision is 
entirely discretionary.51  Many scholars advocate for judges to use their discretion to 
oppose the use of pseudonyms for both practical and constitutional reasons.52  
 
III. HARMS OF PSEUDONYMOUS LITIGATION  
 While the areas of law discussed above are said to benefit from anonymity, some 
courts hesitate to allow their use at all.53  Scholars have argued that pseudonyms burden 
the constitutional right to open court proceedings and that if one party is anonymized, 
both should be.54  Pseudonyms may also not be effective in achieving their goal of 
genuine anonymity, thus, rendering them arbitrary.55 The following section turns to 
addressing each of these concerns. 
 
A. Constitutional Concerns 
The use of pseudonymous litigation implicates the constitutional right to open and 
 
necessary to protect the privacy of children, rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or 
witnesses. But the fact that a case involves a medical issue is not a sufficient reason for allowing the 
use of a fictitious name, even though many people are understandably secretive about their medical 
problems.” Doe v. Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872.  
50 McDonough, supra note 20, at 18. 
51 Michuda, supra note 22, at 170–71; Steinman, supra note 12, at 6. 
52 See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d at 710.  
53 See id. 
54 Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a Pseudonymous 
Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1659, 1712 (1995).  
55 Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiff, and Pseudonyms: the Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the 
Information Age, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 249 (2004). 
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public access to court proceedings, held to exist under the First and Sixth Amendments.56  
There is a public interest in knowing what occurs in judicial proceedings that is 
“frustrated when any part of litigation is conducted in secret.”57  In Press-Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court extended the open-cases doctrine to all civil 
proceedings and ruled that, under the first amendment, voir dire must be open to the 
public unless there is an overriding interest likely to prejudice an open proceeding and the 
closure must be no broader than necessary.58  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 
similarly found a First Amendment right for the press and public to be in a courtroom 
during the testimony of minor victims of sex crimes, although it held that there should be 
case-by-case limitations.59  In a more broad holding, the Superior Court of Connecticut 
has held “the operation of the courts is certainly an aspect of the functioning of 
government so that public access to court proceedings should be protected on First 
Amendment grounds.”60  Joan Steinman argues that, because this line of cases recognizes 
a First Amendment basis to access to Court proceedings, based on the need to ensure self-
government, the Supreme Court has ensured a right to open proceedings for both criminal 
and civil actions.61   
 
56 U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI. 
57 Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d at 710.  
58 Steinman, supra note 2, at 34 (citing Free-Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 
517–518 (1984) (“‘Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common 
understanding that 'a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.’’ Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). By offering such protection, 
the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government." Id., at 604.”). 
59 Id. at 6–7 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)).  
60 Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 157 (1994). 
61 Steinman, supra note 2, at 10. 
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The Sixth Amendment objection is less persuasive in regard to pseudonymous 
litigation because its use does not preclude open court proceedings, rather it just conceals 
the name of one or more parties.62  The public would still have access and ability to 
attend court and see court transcripts, as they could with any trial.63  Allowing parties to 
proceed pseudonymously makes them more likely to bring a claim or testify, because 
they have the assurance of privacy.64  Further, in many instances of pseudonymous 
litigation, an arrangement is reached to reveal the anonymous party’s identity in an 
affidavit under seal, so opposing counsel and party would know the identity of any 
accuser.65 
 
B. Harms of Single-Party Pseudonyms   
Some scholars have also argued against the use of one-party pseudonyms.66  
Adam Milani argues that, if the act or event that the plaintiff claims occurred is so 
stigmatizing, the person accused of the committing the stigmatizing act (who is innocent 
until proven guilty) likewise deserves protection.67  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz notes the 
example of Doe v. Smith, where the defendant, Smith, was accused of recording a sexual 
encounter with Jane Doe without her consent.68  The Seventh Circuit, in determining the 
use of pseudonym, said Smith was “denied the shelter of anonymity—yet it is Smith, and 
 
62 Edwards, supra note 10, at 443. 
63 Id. 
64 Michuda, supra note 22, at 174; Rosenberger, supra note 14, at 580. 
65 Steinman, supra note 2, at 86. 
66 Milani, supra note 54, at 1712. 
67 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2010) (citing 
Milani, supra note 54, at 1712). 
68 Id. at 1241.  
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not the plaintiff, who faces disgrace if the complaint’s allegations can be substantiated.  
And if the complaint’s allegations are false, then anonymity provides a shield behind 
which defamatory charges may be launched without shame or liability.”69  If the 
allegations are in fact false, however, the accused would have the legal recourse of a 
countersuit for defamation.  
In the case of Doe v. Diocese Corp, involving an alleged sexual assault by a 
clergyman, the defendant church and clergyman also attempted to be an pseudonymous 
party because “public disclosure of highly sensitive, unproven allegations would 
undermine the harm the trust placed by the public in the defendants institutions.”70  
Strahilevitz compares these one-sided protections to reviews on Amazon or Trip Advisor, 
where individuals can anonymously critique the organization without holding the 
complainant accountable.71  On the other hand, those with genuine claims can also feel 
more protected and comfortable bringing their allegations.72  Indeed, the Court in Doe v. 
Diocese Corp held that “the fact that pseudonym status has been given to one party does 
not mean that the other party is entitled to identical treatment.”73 
 
C. Ineffectiveness of Pseudonyms  
 A strong argument against the use of pseudonyms is the inability of 
pseudonymous litigation to ever fully be anonymous.74  The required disclosures of 
 
69 Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005). 
70 Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 155 (1994). 
71 Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 1248. 
72 Ressler, supra note 55, at 251.  
73 Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 1243 (quoting Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. at 162-63).  
74 Rosenberger, supra note 14, at 596. 
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discovery necessitate that the defendant and their counsel will almost inevitably know the 
plaintiff’s identity.75  Further, this point is moot in many cases of valid claims where the 
defendant has complained publicly or has been involved in administrative proceedings.76  
If the evidence includes photographic or video evidence, the plaintiff’s identity will also 
be revealed, including their presenting gender.77  
 However, despite the unlikelihood of having complete anonymity, there is 
certainly benefit gained from partial anonymity.78  While the defendant or judge may 
know who the pseudonymous party is, perhaps through a sealed affidavit, in the case of a 
jury trial, the jury does not have to.79  In the instance of a bench trial, another judge could 
be asked to rule on the motion for pseudonym so that the party remains anonymous to the 
final decision-maker.  In public or often-cited cases, not having the party’s name in the 
caption also prevents their name being associated with the events in perpetuity; there is 
certainly great social benefit to not having one’s name associated with their sensitive 
litigation as the first result on an internet search, or printed on the pages of a case book.80 
Without arguing further for the benefit of pseudonyms generally, this note 
proceeds under the premise that, given the number of cases allowed to proceed 
pseudonymously, the U.S. system currently accepts the use of pseudonyms as judicially 
valid.  In the event that they are used, and refer to sensitive subjects, this note argues that 
 
75 Id. 
76 Ressler, supra note 55, at 249–50. 
77 See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) (presenting video evidence in a case 
where Smith recorded Jane Doe without her consent during a sexual encounter, then circulated the 
video online and among peers).   
78 Rosenberger, supra note 14, at 580. 
79 Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989). 
80 Ressler, supra note 55, at 256. 
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there is no benefit, and in fact much harm, that arises from gendering these pseudonyms.   
 
IV. GENDERED PSEUDONYMS 
 To understand the claims made in this note, it is important to first look to the 
benefits of using gendered pseudonyms, solely to highlight that they are very limited.  
While it may seem imperative to disclose the gender of the parties in sexual assault 
litigation, as one example, this is only so because many view the act of sexual assault 
through gendered glasses.81  The traditional requirements to prove rape include 1) sexual 
intercourse 2) by force or threat of force and 3) non-consent.82  There is no necessity to 
disclose that a victim is of a certain gender to meet these elements.83  In fact, it would be 
more probative to discuss weight and height, as many women are larger than many men 
and vice versa.84  The reason gender seems relevant to sexual assault is because of the 
assumptions we have about each gender, whether in regard to physical, emotional or 
mental traits.85  Those assumptions can have negative consequences in the courtroom.86 
 Including gender in cases involving sexual assault also reveals whether the assault 
 
81 Gillian Mezey & Michael King, Male Victims of Sexual Assault, 22 MED. SCI. & L. 122, 122 (1987) 
(“The popular conception of the rapist as an over-sexed heterosexual man who is seeking sexual 
gratification, reinforces the myth of the rape victim as a young attractive female”). 
82 Karina Eileraas, Legal Definitions of Rape, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN IN TODAY'S WORLD 
1205–09 (Mary Zeiss Stange, Carol K. Oyster, and Jane E. Sloan eds., 2011). 
83 Id. 
84 Mezey & King, supra note 81, at 122 (noting that many sexual assaults are “gender blind” in that 
the attacker just looks for a physically weaker target).  
85 Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 7 (1989). 
86 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of 
Judge- Dominate Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010). 
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was same-sex or opposite-sex.87  This too seems like a factor irrelevant to the 
determination of whether an assault occurred and, if known, could have biasing effects on 
the decision-maker, as will be further discussed below.88  
 Another perceived benefit of gendering pseudonyms is that gendered violence, as 
a crime, is different in nature than traditional assault and there is social value in gathering 
empirical evidence of the frequency and nature of these crimes.89  However, the ability to 
collect statistical information about violence against women would not necessarily be 
hampered by pseudonymous litigation; the research could be based on police reports and 
charges made by prosecutors, when the victim has not yet been made anonymous.90  The 
option to use a pseudonym also may encourage more individuals to come forward with 
their claims, thereby increasing the accuracy of data about sexual assault generally.91  
Another option would be to provide information on gender, for limited statistical 
purposes, with consent of the party after the final decision was made.  Even if we are to 
concede that it would be most effective to collect data from final case dispositions and 
include gender, this benefit should be weighed against the harm of potentially biasing a 
 
87 Michuda, supra note 22, at 174 n.262. 
88 See ERIN C. WESTGATE, RACHEL G. RISKIND & BRIAN A. NOSEK, IMPLICIT PREFERENCES FOR 
STRAIGHT PEOPLE OVER LESBIAN WOMEN AND GAY MEN WEAKENED FROM 2006-2013 (2015). 
89 Aaron Horth, Toward a Comprehensive Gender-Based Violence Court System, 24 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 221, 237 (2015) (describing the goals of the 2013 VAWA Reauthorization as “improving civil 
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jury with gendered assumptions.92   
 There are no large systemic, practical or theoretic reasons why gender could not 
be removed from pseudonymous party names.  The small inconveniences that may arise 
do not nearly outweigh the burden that gendered assumption and the lack of respect for 
identity for non-binary individuals seeking justice through litigation.   
 
A. Harms Created  
 As noted at the onset, the harms that occur from gendering pseudonymous parties 
are of two varieties.  The first harm comes to non-binary or transgender individuals who 
do not wish to identify as either male or female.93  The second harm occurs to all 
individuals who, when labeled with a gender, become affected by biases, stereotypes and 
assumptions that affect their ability to receive impartial justice.94  The following will 
address each of these harms in turn, beginning with a general discussion of the harms of 
stereotypes and bias.  
 Stereotypes arise as a result of a “representativeness heuristic.”95  A heuristic is a 
mental shortcut and one of representativeness creates a judgment about a person or group 
based not on a “true probabilistic assessment” but on perceived characteristics and 
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tropes.96  These perceptions may come from stereotypes, which are automatic mental 
processes that are inescapable and can occur “despite deliberate attempts to bypass or 
ignore them.”97  It is possible to override these automatic stereotypes, but the repeated 
and long history of activation makes them “more accessible” than explicit or preferred 
personal beliefs.98  To engage personal beliefs rather than automatic stereotypes, 
“conscious attention” is required.99  Patricia Devine describes this as “overcome[ing] a 
lifetimes of socialization experiences.”100  Because stereotypes are so embedded, 
automatic and act as shortcuts, they infiltrate everyday decisions in a way that is not 
always noticed.101  
 The concern with stereotypes is that their “inevitable consequence” is bias, which 
is the “tendency to react differently to stimuli based on particular characteristics of the 
stimuli.”102  Bias can be either explicit (e.g., overtly sexist, racist, homophobic) or 
implicit, but is present in all people.103  When bias negatively impacts how a person is 
treated, the result is prejudice.104  In regard to litigation, prejudice can lead jurors or 
judges to not believe parties or witnesses, to see them as acting against perceived norms 
in a way that the decision-maker finds negative.105   
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Harvard’s Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has made a large impact in the field 
of implicit bias studies by “measur[ing] the strength of associations between concept 
(e.g., black people, gay people) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g., 
athletic, clumsy).”106  The test consists of a series of pictures that the test taker must 
rapidly sort.107  If the concept in the image is already mentally associated with a category, 
the test taker will be able to categorize it more quickly.108  The test alleges to effectively 
assess bias because the sorting does not require introspection or self-judgment, but rather 
measures beliefs that are somewhat uncontrollable.109 
 One’s experience serving as a judge or jury member, even if conscious that one 
needs to be a neutral adjudicator, does not eradicate stereotypes and the resulting 
prejudice.110  Mark Bennett cautions that implicit bias is so powerful that it affects 
decisions about who to believe and is not left behind “when [judges or jurors] walk 
through the courthouse doors.”111  Heuristic decisions, such as the stereotype-informed 
representativeness heuristic, lead to irrational decisions that are especially harmful in the  
courtroom context.112  In a study of trial court judges, researchers found that judges were 
likely to engage in what was termed the “intuitive-override model of judging.”113  The 
intuitive-override model is in contrast with what many judges report that they follow, 
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which is a more rational “deliberative model” of judging.114  Using intuition to judge 
becomes dangerous because it allows in “undesirable influences, like race, gender or 
attractiveness of the parties.”115  Realist theorists argue that judges in fact decide by 
“feeling, and not by judgment” and then “later use[] deliberative faculties not only to 
justify that intuition to [themselves], but to make it pass muster.”116 
The bias that judges harbor is described by Craig Jones as “systematic, invisible, 
robust and susceptible to manipulation.”117  This means that lawyers have the opportunity 
to “exploit” these biases to receive a ruling in their client’s favor.118  Lawyers also have 
the opportunity to skew results through whom they accept to serve on a jury.119  While 
there are systems in place like voir dire, peremptory strikes and Batson challenges, which 
aim to root out biased jury members, Bennett claims these practices can “allow implicit 
bias to flourish.”120  Striking a juror can eliminate only explicit bias, but the biases that 
are implicit, that we all harbor and that are not necessarily known to us, will go 
unchecked.121  Further, peremptory strikes allow an opportunity for attorney biases to 
surface.  Because it is impossible to eliminate implicit bias entirely, it is crucial that we 
acknowledge where it can exist and to respond to it with procedural mechanisms that 
prevent its spread.  Ceasing the use of gendered pseudonyms is one simple way that we 
can prevent bias about gender to come through and affect legal decision-making.  By 
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limiting exposure to the stereotype-laden characteristics of the parties, the judicial system 
may be able to avoid instances of prejudice.  
 
B. Harm to the LGBTQ Community 
1. Harm to Identity Formation  
In recent history, the rate of individuals identifying as gender nonconforming has 
increased and non-binary individuals have become more socially visible.122  The law has 
followed suit, banning discrimination based on sexual and gender identity and as a result, 
the LGBTQ community has been empowered to bring more claims in court.123  However, 
social norms do not always change quickly and deep-seated constructs of how society 
should look lead to implicit bias that is not easy to eliminate.124  
 The selection of “Jane Doe” or “John Doe” is one example of the judicial 
system’s bureaucratic inability to keep up with increasing inclusiveness and changing 
societal values.  To force an individual to choose a binary gender, when they do not 
identify with one, is to deny them the ability to accurately express their identity.125  
Courts, in some instances, have refused to refer to transgender parties by their chosen 
pronoun.126  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied a 
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transgender plaintiff’s request to use female pronouns because the plaintiff “remain[ed] a 
biological male.”127  Courts justify their decisions not to use a party’s preferred pronoun 
by citing “ease of discussion” and “administrative clarity.”128  These bureaucratic 
rationales come at the cost of denying basic dignity and equal respect. 
 Philosopher Sara Guyer astutely describes the history of chosen self-identity as 
one beginning in Roman times, where a person developed a “persona” that functioned as 
their “place in social, juridical and moral life.”129  Only when they had this “persona,” 
and it was recognized by others, were they a full citizen.130  Philosophers through history 
have emphasized that social recognition by others “allows one to live as a person” and is 
“inseparable from being human.”131 Hegel states that the highest form of spirit is when 
the “inner being. . . confronts its own self and enters into outer existence” to receive 
“reciprocal recognition.”132  Importantly, the aspect of the self that is not being respected 
here, gender, is an inherent and inseparable part of who the person is and how they want 
to be regarded by others.133  
 Identity formation also requires a degree of autonomy and ability to choose the 
way you are presenting yourself to others.134  “Self-determination ‘involves having the 
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freedom and opportunities to make and enact choices of practical import to one’s life, 
that is choices about what to value, who to be, and what to do.’”135  Self-determination 
further “presumes choice and rejects an imposition to be externally controlled, defined, or 
regulated.”136   
Not recognizing the identity of non-binary individuals, as a matter of course, in 
judicial processes means the government gives the non-binary individual unequal respect 
and denies the abilities of autonomy and self-determination.137  The judicial system 
“gives way to practices that impede upon such individuals' ability to freely express 
themselves in a manner consistent with their own identities.”138  
 There is inherent value in having one’s identity recognized.139  For many in the 
LGBTQ community, this means society should not be permitted to force them to identify, 
for government purposes or otherwise, in a way that is not in accord with their identity.  
Pseudonymous litigation existing in a binary fashion arbitrarily and thoughtlessly forces 
non-binary individuals into a category inconsistent with their identity.  
 
2. Harm Arising from Bias 
 There is an additional concern of bias against the LGBTQ community when 
gendered pronouns are used.140  Gendering parties, in issues involving sexual conduct, 
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would result in disclosure of whether the assault was same-sex or opposite-sex.141  In an 
ideal world, it would not matter, but many judges and juries may harbor inappropriate 
prejudice towards same sex sexual interactions or relationships.  Harvard’s IAT measures 
implicit bias towards gay individuals in its “Sexuality” IAT test, which they assert 
“reveals an automatic preference for straight relative to gay people.”142  In 2013, the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project found that 60% of people globally felt that gay individuals 
should be accepted, which is a nine percent improvement from ten years earlier.143  
Although this is surely a step in the right direction, it still depicts that a large swath of 
society, 40%, harbor implicit — if not explicit — prejudice.144  Implicit bias is also 
slower to be eradicated.145  For example, while more accepting individuals may be in the 
process of eliminating implicit bias, having already eliminated explicit bias, more 
traditional individuals may still hold, or are in the process of eliminating explicit 
biases.146  Older demographic groups are also shown to shift towards acceptance at a 
much slower rate.147  
 As demonstrated above, bias is dangerous when it exists in the judicial system.148  
Judges or jury members may be prejudiced against parties who are members of the 
LGBTQ community.  A judge’s political inclinations, while they should be shed for the 
 
141 Michuda, supra note 22, at 174 n.262. 
142 Project Implicit, supra note 106.  




147 Scott Sleek, The Bias Beneath: Two Decades of Measuring Implicit Associations, ASSOCIATION 
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (Feb. 2018), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/the-bias-
beneath-two-decades-of-measuring-implicit-associations. 
148 Bennett, supra note 86, at 150. 
 
	 24 
sake of an impartial judiciary, may implicitly bias their rulings. For example, a study by 
Cass Sunstein and others in the early 2000s shows that when a circuit court panel was 
made of three appointees from Republican presidents, they issued a conservative ruling 
66% of the time.149  The result, the authors state, is “luck of the draw.”150  Of the current 
federal judiciary, 58% were appointed by a Democratic president and 42% were 
appointed by a Republican.151  Although, ideologically, this may imply that a slight 
majority would be likely to support gay rights, it is not clear that even the liberal judges 
have totally eliminated any residual prejudice, especially older judges.152  However, take 
as one example of potential bias, John Bush who was recently nominated by President 
Trump to the 6th Circuit and is known for his anti-LGBTQ record and statements.153  In 
response to his nomination, 27 LGBTQ-rights groups submitted a letter opposing his 
appointment.154  It is of course, not always the case that a conservative judge would be 
opposed to gay rights, especially if they are properly adhering to law and precedent 
protecting these rights.  In many trial court cases however, questions of rights may not be 
directly at issue and there may not be a precedent on point, it could perhaps just be a non-
heterosexual litigant who then may become the victim of bias.  
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 On the other hand, judges may be biased against an individual claiming to be gay, 
but not acting “gay enough” — that is, conforming with what the judge or larger society 
perceive as the stereotypical traits of a member of the LGBTQ community.155  This issue, 
as described by Deborah Morgan, arises commonly in cases where an individual is 
claiming asylum based on sexual orientation and fear of persecution in their home 
country.156  The result is that individuals must “prove” their orientation and are judged 
based on “racialized sexual stereotypes and culturally specific notions of 
homosexuality.”157  
The Washington state courts have acknowledged the concern that potential bias 
raises and attempted to combat it with their LGBTQ bench guide.158  The guide astutely 
notes that getting the “‘right’ decisions” is not enough to “offset the perception of bias, 
especially when many decisions involve exercise of judicial discretion and weighing of 
evidence.”159  Guides like this aim to highlight potential bias and make implicit 
neurological processes conscious and perhaps limit them.  Further, eliminating gendered 
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C. Bias Based on Gender 
 Gendering pseudonymous litigation injects gender bias into the judicial system, 
which can impact rulings of the court and juries, and further biases readers of cases after 
publication.160  It is important to note, too, that all of the harms from bias discussed in 
this section may be forced upon a non-binary person who, for the sake of judicial 
proceedings, is forced to bear the burden of a gender they do not identify as.  
 Cases of sexual assault are particularly ripe for bias, especially against male 
survivors. Many individuals may be discouraged from bringing sexual assault cases 
because they are afraid that prejudice against them might prevent them from getting 
impartial justice.161  Many men underreport sexual assaults because of the stigma 
associated with being a victim.162  According to The Rape, Abuse & Incest National 
Network (RAINN), three percent of American men have stated that they are survivors of 
sexual assault, but experts believe that the number of actual survivors is much larger.163  
Of men sexually assaulted in the military, for example, only 13% reported their assault.164  
Males are particularly unlikely to report because they do not want to be associated with 
traits they perceive as that of a “victim,” such as being weak or unable to protect 
themselves, which they may view as in conflict with traditional male attributes they wish 
to portray.165  Many male victims also fear that they will not be believed if they were 
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assaulted by a woman, or will be labeled as “gay” if assaulted by a male (and do not 
identify as gay).166  All of these factors in combination may lead men to believe if they 
come forward, they will be met with prejudice in both reporting the crime and in any later 
court proceedings.167  If survivors of sexual assault could be assured, not just the 
anonymity of not using a name, but the protection of not using their gender, more 
individuals (and men in particular) might come forward with their claims.  This would 
help survivors receive the justice they deserve and would ensure the safety of the 
community by bringing perpetrators to justice.   
 Beyond the internalization of gender norms that prevents the survivor from 
reporting sexual assault, the jury or judge may also be harboring similar sentiments.168  If 
a man, for example, does decide to report, he still may be perceived by the judge or jury 
as weak, or the decision-maker may not believe his statements.169  On the other hand, the 
judge or jury might assign traits that are traditionally female to a female defendant in a 
sexual assault case: a need to be protected, fragility, kindness.  The decision-makers may 
then be biased against a male accuser.   
In regard to both genders, beliefs about how an individual should have behaved in 
a sexual assault situation often dominate, especially when the case may depend on 
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testimony.170  Women are more likely to be deemed “genuine victims” if they are “chaste 
and respectable, are unknown to their assailant, are sober, have fought back (with injuries 
to prove it), and report the incident immediately to the police” and are less likely to be 
believed if they violated a traditional gender role.171  Studies have also shown that judges 
and jurors perceive women as more credible when they have congruent emotions to the 
events described, such as “crying and showing despair.”172  
 Women, of course, are victims of negative stereotypes beyond those of sexual 
assault, stretching into perceived traditional roles in the home and work place.173  
Harvard’s IAT offers insight into implicit bias in regard to gender and careers and gender 
and science.174  The gender- career test reveals a psychological association between 
woman/family and male/career.175  In this particular test, 75% of test takers correlated 
work roles more strongly with men.176  The gender-science test is shown to link liberal 
arts to females and science to males.177  One way these implicit biases present themselves 
in society is an association between men and positions of power.178  The IAT has shown 
that this is not based on factual differences between the ability of men and women to 
lead, but rather on “stereotypes and assumptions.”179  Strong female leaders also often 
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receive condemnation if they are too aggressive, being labeled as “bossy” or “cold.”180  
Implicit bias against women in leadership is found even among people who expressly 
advocate gender equity.181  This implicit bias has outward effects, too.  At least one study 
has shown that managers who had IAT scores “indicating gender bias tended to favor 
men over women in their hiring decisions.”182 
 Audit studies are a useful demonstration of how bias can outwardly manifest in 
our interactions towards others.  One particular study sent a matched man and woman 
pair to a car dealership to measure the effects of specific characteristics on quoted 
prices.183  Both participants bargained for the same car and followed a script that was 
identical.184  Initial offers to women car buyers was $55 higher than white men and the 
final offer price was $130 higher than that of white men.185  For African American 
females, the gap in final offer was $400, emphasizing the intersectionality and 
compounding effect of multiple biases.186  
 Another audit study by Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, expecting that “bias” was a 
possible cause of differences in “hiring, pay, proportion, tenure, and funding outcomes,” 
set out to see how gender would affect success and likelihood of entering academia.187  
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The “students” contacted professors at top universities to inquire, as prospective PhD 
students, into meeting to discuss research opportunities.188  The “students” were assigned 
names that would signal gender, but “their messages were otherwise identical.”189  The 
study found that women were less likely to receive responses and that this lack of support 
likely is at least one cause of the under-representation of women in academia.190  Other 
studies have shown that gender bias can affect formal gateways into organizations in 
general, such as in admissions and hiring, and on performance once they have entered, 
including promotions, pay, grades and more.191 
Not only does bias surface in regard to gender, but it has a tendency to surface 
more rapidly and easily than currently existing views of equality.192  In a study by 
Higgins and King (1981), subjects were asked to describe themselves and others.193  
When gender was not salient, the descriptions the participants gave were aligned with 
traditional gender attributes.194  The psychologists found that this was due to the longer 
history of gender stereotypes and ease of passive, automatic activation.195  However, 
when gender was salient, the subjects gave descriptions more consistent with their 
“recently developed modern views of gender-linked attributes.”196  The consciousness of 
gender allowed the participants to control their unconscious inclinations and give 
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description that matched their explicit beliefs.  
While these biases may seem wide ranging, it is clear to see how they could 
surface in many different legal cases.  For example, if a female employer is being sued 
for harassment, implicit attitudes about women in the workplace and women in 
leadership positions could be implicated.197  Additionally, family law cases, specifically 
in regard to custody, are affected by societal perceptions of the role of women and the 
family.198  If a woman is acting in a way that a judge or juror finds discordant with what 
they perceive to be the role of a person of a woman, they may be prejudiced against her 
in a way that hurts her credibility, or the likelihood of believing her account of the 
facts.199  The need for credibility is extremely important in cases like sexual assault, 
where testimony is heavily relied upon.200  
 
D. In-Group Bias 
Psychologists studying gender bias have found that bias against gender is also 
evidence of “homophily,” or the “tendency to prefer associating with those who are 
similar to us.”201  Categorization of oneself as similar to someone else based on “shared 
identity-relevant traits” results in “better treatment of demographic in-group than out-
group members.”202   
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In the case of judicial preference, this is concerning because judges are 
predominately white, male, cis-gendered and straight.203  A judge’s background and 
characteristics “may affect how one approaches and perceives the issues in a case,” even 
if it is not dispositive of their vote.204  Studies on in-group bias in regard to race reveal 
that in cases involving racial harassment in the workplace, success was more likely if the 
judge was African American.205  President Obama nominated the most female judges to 
the federal bench, but his nominees were still 58% male-identifying.206  To emphasize the 
slow progress to include women on the federal bench: President Clinton was the very first 
president to have over 20% of his nominees be female.207  President Obama appointed 
more women to the bench than Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush 
combined.208  Thus, it is likely that female plaintiffs may have a male judge and he may 
have an out-group bias against her.209 
There are also only two transgender judges in the U.S., Victoria Kolakowski in 
California and Phyllis Frye in Texas.210  Of the first 123 nominees to the federal courts 
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that President Trump made, none were openly members of the LGBTQ community.211  
This means that members of the LGBTQ community are almost always in the “out-
group” of the Judge.212  Carl Tobias notes the importance of inclusion on the bench, 
stating that members of the LGBTQ community provide “valuable insight” and “help 
restrict various sexual orientation, ethnic and gender prejudices that can operate to 
subvert justice’s delivery.”213  Professor Theresa Bernier also notes that a diverse bench 
can have the positive effect of sending the message that all are welcome and represented 
in judicial service—one that is rarely received.214  
 If members of the jury or the judge are of a different gender or orientation than 
the parties, they may unconsciously place them in an out-group, which renders them 
subject to biases and even prejudice.215  In revealing gender identity in pseudonyms (and, 
because of that, often sexual identity), the court is putting, in many cases, the 
pseudonymous party in a position of the out-group.  
 
E. Counter Arguments 
 It could be argued that the use of non-gendered pseudonyms may not fully 
achieve the desired results of eliminating bias and respecting chosen identity.  If the 
pseudonymous party chooses to testify in a civil case, or if the victim chooses to be a 
witness in a criminal case, the victim will need to be present in court to adhere with the 
 
211 Carl Tobias, Appointing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Judges in the Trump 
Administration, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 11 (June 2018). 
212 Id. at 11.  
213 Id. at 12. 
214 Stubbs, supra note 205, at 120.  
215 Milkman, Akinola & Chugh, supra note 188, at 1678–1684. 
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Confrontation clause and their gender may be perceived (even if inaccurately).216  While 
victims are not required to testify, the prosecution may not bring charges if they do not 
have sufficient victim/witness testimony.217  Further, if the gender anonymity is not 
carried through to the pronouns in the briefings, the gender of the party would become 
apparent.218  Thus, to effectuate the anonymity, neutral pronouns should be used 
throughout briefings and proceedings.  These concerns threaten the complete 
effectiveness of eliminating gender bias entirely, but even if gender becomes salient in 
some pseudonymous cases (just as it is in most, if not all non-pseudonymous cases), 
gender-neutral pseudonyms would be helpful in many highly sensitive cases.  
 Even if the party manages to remain non-gendered, they may have been affected 
by implicit and explicit bias at other levels of the judicial process.219  For example, the 
bias of law enforcement officers affects who is arrested and the bias of prosecutors 
affects who is charged.220  All of this would occur before any motion to use a 
pseudonym.221  Even the judge ruling on the motion to proceed pseudonymously could be 
biased by the gender of the movant.222   
 Proponents of maintaining the gendered system may argue that that partial 
 
216 U.S. CONST. amends. VI (“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him”). 
217 Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter & Jose Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the United States: 
Expanding Victim Protection beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 395 
(2005) (noting that prosecutors need witnesses capable of testifying against perpetrators, but that 
victims and witnesses are not always the same). 
218 See Salpietro, supra note 126, at 162. 
219 Chris Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 113, at 31.  
220 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 97 (2010). 
221 Id. 
222 Jones, supra note 95, at 53–54. 
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implementation would render the entire effort ineffective.  For example, a non-binary 
individual may want a non-gendered pseudonym because they do not identify as male or 
female, and want their gender identity to be private.  However, if only non-binary 
individuals seek non-gendered pseudonyms, it then unintentionally “outs” that person as 
non-binary, contrary to the intended purpose.  To effectively hide all gender, all 
pseudonyms, including for binary individuals, would have to be non-gendered.  This is 
not a negative, as it would limit gender bias for all individuals in the system, but to truly 
implement total anonymity, it would have to be system-wide.  
 All of these concerns fall into the category I call “the perfect is the enemy of the 
good.” Of course, there will always be bias in other areas of the justice system, but that 
does not mean we should accept bias in this instance when it can be easily corrected.  
There will be some instances when the survivor or plaintiff will choose to testify in 
person, thus preventing gender- anonymity, but there still remain many instances in 
which the individual would not appear and could effectively remain totally anonymous 
and unaffected by bias.  Even if the efforts are unsuccessful and the decision-maker is 
biased, when the case is published, the law students reading it and the lawyers citing it 
will not be additionally biased in their understanding of the law.  While we may not be 
able to easily eradicate implicit bias entirely, we can limit opportunities to exhibit it in the 
judicial system.  
 Another concern is that my proposal does not go far enough.  Removing gendered 
pseudonyms, even if it works as intended, is putting a bandage on a societal problem.  A 
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larger, long term solution would involve implicit bias training for judges and lawyers.223  
Mandatory jury instructions could also aid in acknowledging the existence of implicit 
bias and encouraging jurors to be conscious of any biases they may hold and not act on 
them.224  Further, societal and legal change generally is needed to ensure that biases do 
not exist in the first place.  For example, the reason implicit bias against same sex couples 
has changed so rapidly is because society itself, and laws pertaining to same sex 
marriage, have also changed.225  To take just one example, the implicit bias against 
women in positions of leadership can be ameliorated by increasing the visibility and 
frequency of women in positions of leadership.226  
 
F. Imperative to Cease the Use of Gendered Pseudonyms 
 Given the limited benefits of gendered pseudonyms and great harms caused by 
their use, it is imperative that the courts allow non-gendered pseudonyms.  There is an 
intrinsic value in identifying people in the way they choose; non-gendered pseudonyms 
 
223 Salpietro, supra note 126, at 168. 
224  See Chris Chambers Goodman, Shadowing the Bar: Attorneys’ Own Implicit Bias, 28 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L.J. 18, 46 (2018) (quoting Judge Bennett’s jury instruction: “[A]s we discussed in jury 
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one's subconscious thoughts, being aware of these hidden biases can help counteract them. As a result, 
I ask you to recognize that all of us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we make. 
Because you're making very important decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to critically 
evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict influenced by stereotypes, generalizations 
or implicit biases”). 
225 WESTGATE, supra note 88. 
226 Abigail Perdue, Man up or Go Home: Exploring Perceptions of Women in Leadership, 100 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1233, 1261 (2017) (“lack of gender diversity, particularly in media outlets, may account for 
portrayals of women in magazines, movies, and television that perpetuate gender stereotypes and 
promote inequality”).  
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would help increase the autonomy of non-binary individuals when they have to deal with 
extremely sensitive litigation.227  Francesco G. Salpietro argues that not addressing 
individuals by their chosen pronouns is a microagression that increases psychological 
harm and erodes feelings of value.228  This, he holds, can be viewed as a violation of the 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct by harming integrity, impartiality and allowing for 
manifestations of bias.229  The Code also requires reduction in the potential for bias; non-
gendered pseudonyms would limit the availability of bias based on gender, sexual 
orientation and gender identity.230  If the goal of pseudonymous litigation is privacy, 
protecting litigants and ensuring access to due process, non-gendered pseudonyms are the 
best means to achieve these ends.   
Subjecting individuals to a system that denies their identity and forces them to be 
judged based on biases, contrary to their request to be anonymous, is oppression.231  
Scholars writing on oppression “generally agree that oppression is an injustice (i) caused 
by the design of the social institutions and (ii) experienced by individuals in virtue of 
belonging to a social group.”232  Gendered pseudonyms are an institution of the 
government that create harmful effects based on the fact that 1) the individual does not 
identify with one of the two given categories of gender and/or 2) the individual does not 
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wish to have the prejudice and biases of a particular gender applied to them and their 
extremely sensitive litigation.  According to this measure, the system in place is 
oppressive to the LGBTQ community and anyone susceptible to a negative stereotype.   
The results of a loss from bias include 1) political deprivation, 2) economic deprivation, 
3) freedom deprivation, 4) psychological harm and 5) deprivation of the capacity to self-
develop.233    
Beyond just the impact on each individual party and each individual cause, the 
message sent to society by forcing individuals into one of two genders, and then also 
applying potentially harmful stereotypes that accompany the gender, creates extensive 
harm.  Richard McAdams’s theory of the “expressive power of the law” encapsulates the 
idea that the law’s function is not merely to deter, but to demonstrate how society should 
act.234  Individuals, whether consciously or unconsciously, guide their social behavior 
around what the law expresses as values.235  The existing system sends the message that 
we as a society view gender as binary.  This does not reflect the actuality of our rapidly 
progressing society and surely does not reflect the actuality of many people’s lives.236  
By deemphasizing gender in the judicial system, we would be able to send a 
message that gender is not monolithic and that individuals are more than the stereotypes 
that their gender applies to them.  To take the example used throughout this note, if more 
men feel comfortable and are believed in their sexual assault claims, not only will they be 
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more comfortable accessing systems of justice, but the societal belief that sexual assault 
only happens to women will decrease, as well.237  
Not only is the need to eliminate gender in pseudonyms extremely important, but 
it also would be easy to implement. Given that initiating a pseudonym is not governed 
explicitly by any rule, there is a lot of discretion for judges and attorneys to make a 
difference.238  Attorneys should make it a norm of their practice to avoid gender in 
litigation they bring pseudonymously.  Judges too should be informed of the benefit of 
total anonymity and the need to avoid implicit bias.  To ensure true gender-anonymity, 
judges can also request other judges to approve motions to proceed pseudonymously and 
motions to disclose true identities in sealed affidavits.  This would prevent judges from 
unwittingly learning the gender of the parties and being biased by them.  Legislatures and 
judges involved in rule making alternatively could take a stance against bias and 
explicitly allow pseudonyms, specifically those without gender.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 With the ability to ensure privacy and prevent retaliation against plaintiffs, 
pseudonyms offer protection for those seeking justice.239  But when pseudonyms allow 
gender to surface, they are not receiving access to impartial justice.   
 Stereotypes have created both explicit and implicit bias.240  This implicit bias is 
 
237 See Mezey & King, supra note 81, at 123. 
238 See Michuda, supra note 22, at 153. 
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pervasive, invisible and cannot be entirely eradicated.241  Allowing gender in litigation 
that is otherwise anonymous creates potential harm for the LGBTQ community and for 
individuals who have stereotypes of their gender imposed upon them.  Thus, it is our duty 
to ensure impartial justice by putting procedures in place to prevent bias from affecting 
and prejudicing judge and jury. 
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